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For a given physical duration, certain events can be experienced as subjectively longer in duration 
than others. Try this for yourself: take a quick glance at the second hand of a clock. Immediately, 
the tick will pause momentarily and appear to be longer than the subsequent ticks. Yet, they all 
last exactly 1 s. By and large, a deviant or an unexpected stimulus in a series of similar events 
(same duration, same features) can elicit a relative overestimation of subjective time (or “time 
dilation”) but, as is shown here, this is not always the case. We conducted an event-related 
functional magnetic neuroimaging study on the time dilation effect. Participants were presented 
with a series of five visual discs, all static and of equal duration (standards) except for the fourth 
one, a looming or a receding target. The duration of the target was systematically varied and 
participants judged whether it was shorter or longer than all other standards in the sequence. 
Subjective time dilation was observed for the looming stimulus but not for the receding one, 
which was estimated to be of equal duration to the standards. The neural activation for targets 
(looming and receding) contrasted with the standards revealed an increased activation of the 
anterior insula and of the anterior cingulate cortex. Contrasting the looming with the receding 
targets (i.e., capturing the time dilation effect proper) revealed a specific activation of cortical 
midline structures. The implication of midline structures in the time dilation illusion is here 
interpreted in the context of self-referential processes.
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IntroductIon
The experience of subjective time flow changes 
continuously. A classic dichotomy can illustrate 
this point: a given duration, say a minute, is not 
experientially invariant. Specifically, when await-
ing for something, or feeling bored or blue, time 
drags; when entertained or absorbed in skillful 
performance, time flies (i.e., we are hardly aware 
of the minutes passing by).
The allocation of attention to time constitutes 
one major factor influencing whether the subjec-
tive flow of time will “speed up” or “slow down:” 
when attention is focused on time, perceived time 
slows down and experienced duration expands; 
when distracted away from it, it speeds up and 
duration contracts. Traditionally, cognitive mod-
els of time perception account for the speeding 
up or slowing down of time passing by positing 
Edited by:
Srikantan S. Nagarajan, University of 
California, San Francisco, USA
Reviewed by:
David T. Blake, Medical College of 
Georgia, USA
Corby L. Dale, University of California 
San Francisco, USA
*Correspondence:
Virginie van Wassenhove is the head of 
the NeuroSpin MagnetoEncephaloGraphy 
center, France. She received her Ph.D. in 
Neurosciences and Cognitive Sciences 
(2004; University of Maryland, College 
Park; analysis-by-synthesis in audiovisual 
speech). She pursued her postdoctoral 
work at UCSF (2005; auditory and 
audiovisual learning and plasticity), 
UCLA (2005–2006; multisensory implicit 
learning), and Caltech (2005–2008; 
Implicit Brain Project; time perception, 
interpersonal interactions). Her research 
interests focus on multisensory 
integration, time perception, and brain 
dynamics.
virginie.van-wassenhove@cea.fr;
van Wassenhove et al. Mechanisms of subjective time dilation
Frontiers in Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 56 | 2
systematically elicited. We now highlight a few 
cases which remain challenging for a general clock 
model framework and which could be parsimoni-
ously accounted for by recent alternative propos-
als. One class of subjective duration effects are 
observed right before saccadic eye movement: in 
chronostasis, a backdating mechanism for tem-
poral labeling of the saccadic onset depends on 
the duration of the preceding eye movement and 
leads to subjective dilation of duration (Yarrow 
et al., 2001); analogous effects have been reported 
in the tactile domain during action (Yarrow and 
Rothwell, 2003). During saccadic movement, the 
perceived order of events can be also inverted 
(Morrone et al., 2005; Binda et al., 2009). Such 
phenomena have been suggested to be tied to a 
neural remapping of temporal events compen-
sating for the delay in producing a movement. 
However, subjective dilation of time can be seen 
without voluntary action for salient auditory 
events for instance (Alexander et al., 2005); more 
generally, the subjective duration of unexpected 
or infrequent stimuli is overestimated as com-
pared to expected and frequent stimuli (Rose 
and Summers, 1995; Tse et al., 2004; Ulrich et al., 
2006). Conversely, stimulus repetition can lead 
to a subjective temporal compression of events 
thereby eliciting an apparent subjective dilation 
in the non-repeated stimulus (Pariyadath and 
Eagleman, 2007; van Wassenhove et al., 2008; 
Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009). These effects 
have been accounted for by an energy efficiency 
model relying on well described neural suppres-
sion effects (Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009) – 
i.e., an automatic low-level encoding of temporal 
features. Additionally, visual adaptation para-
digms can be used to locally distort the apparent 
duration of events (Johnston et al., 2006; Bruno 
et al., 2010) further suggesting that these effects 
do not necessitate attention and can be specific to 
stimulus feature or low-level properties of a given 
stimulus (see for instance Johnston (2010) for a 
local “content-dependent clock”). In line with 
this, a recent computational model has also been 
put forward in which no dedicated system is nec-
essary and which relies on the natural statistics of 
events (Ahrens and Sahani, 2011). Consistent with 
local adaptation mechanisms and content-related 
timing, whereas a looming (expanding) disc 
embedded within a series of standard discs leads 
to subjective time dilation (Tse et al. 2004; van 
Wassenhove et al., 2008), a standard disc embed-
ded within a series of looming discs leads to sub-
jective time compression (van Wassenhove et al., 
2008). An attention allocation mechanism would 
predict temporal dilation not only in the loom-
ing condition but also in the receding condition; 
the existence of an internal “clock” composed 
of a pacemaker (internal pacing of time units) 
and an accumulator (collection of time units) 
whose combined function is to represent sub-
jective duration (Treisman, 1963; Gibbon et al., 
1984). In the “attentional gate clock models,” the 
produced time units or pulses are only registered 
when attention is directed to time (Zakay and 
Block, 1997) leading to the opening of the gate 
and feeding of pulses into a counter.
Yet, two mechanisms can lead to alterations of 
subjective duration: (1) an increased (decreased) 
attention to time leads to an accumulation of 
more (less) pulses over a given time span or (2) 
an arousal-related increase (decrease) of the rate 
of pulses emitted by the pacemaker (faster or 
slower clock rate, respectively), leads to a faster 
(slower) accumulation of temporal units over 
time (Burle and Casini, 2001; Droit-Volet and 
Meck, 2007; Wittmann and Paulus, 2008). For 
instance, heightened emotional states are physi-
ologically accompanied by an increase in arousal, 
which would lead to a higher pacemaker rate 
(Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009): indeed, subjects tend 
to overestimate the duration of highly arousing 
pictures with emotional valence (e.g., angry faces 
or accidents) (Angrilli et al., 1997; Droit-Volet 
et al., 2004). Similarly, an increase in body tem-
perature is also associated with an overestimation 
of duration (Wearden and Penton-Voak, 1995) 
and in dangerous or life-threatening situations, 
people often report that events are prolonged in 
time and that everything occurs in slow motion 
(for such a personal report see Popper and Eccles, 
1986, p. 529). During those moments, one expe-
riences strong emotional distress and needs to 
react as quickly as possible. For these reasons, 
all bodily resources are recruited in a “fight or 
flight mode” enabled by heightened arousal levels 
(Stetson et al., 2007; Wittmann, 2009a). If mental 
processing speeds up considerably, external events 
seem to slow down accordingly as is popularly 
portrayed in “The matrix” combat scenes.
All together, the rate of the pacemaker in 
clock models determines the perceived duration 
of an event whether due to arousal or attention: 
as a rule of thumb, the faster the rate, the more 
units accumulated and the longer the perceived 
duration. However, there is presently no real 
consensus on the how, when and where of such 
clock components in the brain (Wittmann and 
van Wassenhove, 2009) albeit specific functional 
implementations have been proposed, notably 
as a centralized and dedicated system for time 
(Buhusi and Meck, 2005).
In controlled laboratory settings, subjective 
alterations of time (“temporal illusions”) can be 
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Time perception
Of all sensory experiences, “sensing 
time” is a peculiar one: our brains are 
not equipped with time receptors and 
time (abstracted out of the dynamics of 
the perceived environment) poses 
particularly challenging issues in 
perception. What is the object of 
attention when we attend to time? Are 
all senses sensitive to temporal aspects 
of the environment and if so, to which 
extent? We take it that time, as an 
experience, requires specific neural 
mechanisms allowing for the 
construction of a mental representation 
in the reference frame of the embodied 
and conscious self.
Temporal illusions
The time percept is fundamentally 
labile and variant. For instance, an 
auditory and a visual event of equal 
(objective) duration are not perceived 
as such: a sound is typically perceived as 
being longer than a visual event. Within 
a sensory modality, the first event in a 
sequence of identical stimuli, or an 
unexpected or surprising event can lead 
to a relative overestimation of its 
duration. Despite the highly subjective 
and non-invariant nature of time 
perception, temporal illusions can be 
systematically elicited, thereby allowing 
the assessment of natural (architectural 
and computational) constraints on the 
construction of a time percept.
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an adaptation mechanism would rather  predict 
such perceptual inversion (van Wassenhove et al., 
2008). Hence, several explanations are currently 
debated: (1) the attentional gate model (in line 
with clock models): the subjective dilation of 
duration results from an increase of attention 
directed to the deviant stimulus (Tse et al., 2004; 
New and Scholl, 2009); (2) the energy efficiency 
coding: a greater amount of energy expenditure 
for the encoding of a deviant stimulus leads 
to subjective duration dilation in comparison 
to higher “coding efficiency” and less energy 
expenditure for standard stimuli (Eagleman and 
Pariyadath, 2009); (3) the local neural compu-
tations attuned to inherent stimuli properties: 
temporal effects can be driven by the intrinsic 
dynamics of the stimulus, namely, faster moving 
stimuli or stimuli with higher flicker frequency 
last subjectively longer (Kanai et al., 2006; New 
and Scholl, 2009). New computational schemes 
for time estimation are thus emerging albeit with 
different neural implementations (Karmakar and 
Buonomano, 2007; Johnston, 2010; Ahrens and 
Sahani, 2011).
Surprisingly little to no neuroimaging data are 
currently available that would provide insights on 
the neural mechanisms mediating such temporal 
illusions. Here, we report an event-related func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study 
(Wittmann et al., 2010b) using a previously dem-
onstrated illusory effect. In this study, subjects 
viewed a stream of five visual events, all of which 
were static and of identical duration except for the 
fourth one, which was a deviant target consisting 
of a looming or a receding disc (van Wassenhove 
et al., 2008). The use of an experimental paradigm 
using a looming signal as a (deviant) target in a 
stream of steady (standard) events allowed us to 
test (i) the specificity of temporal dilation and 
(ii) the neural underpinnings of time perception 
with respect to self. Looming signals are not only 
salient and attention-drawing events (Yantis and 
Egeth, 1999; Franconeri et al., 2005; for a refined 
hypothesis see Skarratt et al., 2009) they also 
simulate approaching objects and constitute an 
intrinsic threat cue. For instance, rhesus monkeys 
show a persistent avoidance response to looming 
stimuli (Schiff et al., 1962) and brain responses 
specific to the dynamics of this stimulus develop 
in the first year of life in humans (van der Weel 
and van der Meer, 2009). Looming signals are 
natural self-referential events: the time-to-(self) 
contact of such stimuli needs to be computed 
rapidly for planning an adequate escape behavior.
Our hypothesis was that looming signals 
engage brain structures involved in the process-
ing of time in self-referential coordinates. This 
bears particular relevance in the context of a recent 
proposal  pertaining to the experience of time as 
a  self-referential process (Craig, 2008, 2009a,b). 
One predicted implicated neural structure was 
the insular cortex which is functionally involved 
in interoception and is a key area for the integration 
of information originating within the body and for 
a meta-representation of homeostatic feelings. The 
insular cortex would naturally be at the core of the 
experienced self at one moment in time, providing 
a continuity of subjective awareness across time 
through a series of elementary emotional moments 
(Craig, 2009a). It is noteworthy that although acti-
vation of the insular cortex has been repeatedly 
shown in neuroimaging studies on time percep-
tion (e.g., Pouthas et al., 2005; Livesey et al., 2007; 
Gutyrchik et al., 2010), it is only recently that the 
insular cortex has been discussed as causally relat-
ing to the processing of duration and the experi-
ence of time (Craig, 2008, 2009a; Wittmann, 2009b; 
Kosillo and Smith, 2010; Wittmann et al., 2010a).
MaterIals and Methods
Psychophysical and fMRI data of 15 right-handed 
participants (seven female; mean age: 26 years) were 
analyzed in this study. First, participants under-
went a psychophysical test outside the scanner (pre-
fMRI) followed by a similar psychophysical test 
during fMRI. In the pre-fMRI session, participants 
were presented with a stream of five visual events 
consisting of three consecutive standard discs 
(STANDARD), one looming, receding or steady 
target (LOOM, RECEDE, STEADY) and one last 
STANDARD disc (Figure 1). In the fMRI session, 
the target stimulus consisted of either LOOM or 
RECEDE (i.e., the target was never STEADY). The 
target was systematically varied in duration and 
always the fourth event in the stream of ∼500 ms 
STANDARD discs (fMRI condition: 494.2 ms). 
The stimuli consisted of gray disks centered on the 
monitor screen displayed on a black background. 
Participants had to judge the duration of the tar-
get compared to all STANDARD discs. Participants 
judged in a two-alternative forced choice whether 
the target was “shorter” or “longer” than all other 
STANDARD in the trial (i.e., the first, second, third, 
and fifth stimuli). Due to hardware constraints 
(refresh rate) slight differences in standard and 
target durations were chosen in the pre-fMRI 
and the fMRI sessions: in the pre-fMRI session, 
STANDARD was 500 ms and targets were ±23.3, 
±10, or ±3.3% of this duration; in the fMRI session, 
STANDARD was 494.2 ms and targets were ±23.8, 
±7.1, or ±2.4% of the standard duration.
The pre-fMRI session was conducted to (1) 
train the subjects in the task, (2) evaluate the per-
ceived duration of a steady target to control for 
Self-referential
A self-referential process implicates a 
form of recursion, namely, that the 
representation of self is incorporated in 
the encoding and analysis of a world 
event. Formally, a self-referential 
process functionally implicates the self, 
for instance as a reference frame or 
context of the event being analyzed. The 
neural structures likely implicated in 
such contextual representation of self 
are the cortical midline structures. It is 
noteworthy that not all events can be 
deemed as self-referential: the temporal 
properties of a bird’s song provide 
information about its identity as a bird 
within a species (not self-referential) 
whereas your hand tapping the rhythm 
of a popular song illustrates your self 
tuning to the song’s rhythm (a potential 
case of self-referential embodiment). 
The looming stimuli we used in this 
study are related to the self insofar as 
they can be interpreted as threatening 
events (an abstraction of an object 
approaching toward you with a 
potential impact).
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the compression of duration due to adaptation to 
 repetition (Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009), and 
(3) replicate prior findings with respect to time 
dilation observed in deviant looming but not 
receding stimulus presentation (van Wassenhove 
et al. 2008). To preserve a dynamic control (size, 
motion, integrated luminance, etc.), the receding 
signal was the control for the looming condition in 
the fMRI task, pending replication of the perceptual 
effects. Participants were scanned in a 3T GE Sigma 
scanner. Data were analyzed with the Analysis of 
Functional NeuroImages (AFNI) software package. 
Brain activations corresponding to each stimulus 
were contrasted (LOOM vs. STANDARD, RECEDE 
vs. STANDARD, and LOOM vs. RECEDE) using 
the estimated voxel-wise response amplitude and 
function for each regressor of interest covering 
the specific stimulus duration. t-Tests were used 
to probe for activation differences between the 
selected stimulus contrasts. A threshold adjustment 
method using Monte-Carlo simulations provided 
significant regions of interest which were corrected 
both on the voxel and cluster level (P < 0.001 and 
P < 0.05) if a minimum volume of 512 μl (1440 μl) 
and a connectivity radius of 4.0 mm was consid-
ered. For methodological details concerning the 
fMRI analysis, see Wittmann et al. (2010b).
results
Pre-fMrI PsychoPhysIcs
The psychophysical results replicated prior find-
ings (van Wassenhove et al., 2008): a temporal 
dilation effect was observed for LOOM but not 
for RECEDE targets as can be seen in Figure 2A 
(percent of “longer” responses for the target as a 
function of target duration). The points of sub-
jective equality (PSE; Figure 2C) significantly dif-
fered in the LOOM vs. the STEADY conditions 
[t(1,10) = −3.846, P < 0.003), in the LOOM vs. 
the RECEDE conditions [t(1,11) = −5.269, 
P < 0.0001], but not in the RECEDE vs. the 
STEADY conditions [t(1,12) = −1.291, P = 0.221]. 
On average, a looming target of 419 ms was per-
ceived as having the same duration as a stand-
ard event of 500 ms (Figure 2C). Note that the 
STEADY [PSE: 524 ms, t(1,12) = 1.905, P = 0.081] 
and the RECEDE [PSE: 498 ms, t(1,13) = 0.316, 
P = 0.757] stimuli were not significantly perceived 
as shorter than the standard duration of 500 ms 
suggesting that the dilation effect does not result 
from a compression of the standard durations.
fMrI – PsychoPhysIcs results
On the basis of the pre-fMRI behavioral results, 
we selected the main contrast for the fMRI to be 
the LOOM (illusory duration) vs. RECEDE (no 
illusory duration) targets. In the fMRI session, the 
PSE obtained in the LOOM and the RECEDE con-
ditions differed significantly [t(1,13) = −7.365, 
P < 0.0001] (Figures 2B,D). As in the pre-fMRI 
session, a time dilation effect was observed for 
LOOM but not for RECEDE. On average, a 
406 ms looming event was subjectively equal to 
the 494 ms STANDARD event (Figure 2D).
STANDARD
500 ms
STANDARD
500 ms
STANDARD
500 ms
TARGET
Variable
STANDARD
500 ms
STEADY
pre-fMRI
LOOM
pre-fMRI, fMRI
RECEDE
pre-fMRI, fMRI
time
variable ISI
FIguRe 1 | experimental design: a trial consisted of a 
stream of five visual events, four standards (in first, 
second, third and fifth position) and one target (fourth 
position). All standards were static discs of ∼500 ms 
duration (STANDARD); all targets were presented in fourth 
position in the sequence and varied in duration. In the 
pre-fMRI session, a target could be static (STEADY), 
looming (LOOM) or receding (RECEDE). In the fMRI 
session, a target was either LOOM or RECEDE. The 
inter-stimulus intervals (ISI) and the inter-trial intervals (ITI) 
were pseudo-randomly chosen from 500 to 1000 ms (ISI), 
2 to 4 s (ITI pre-fMRI), and 12 to 14 s (ITI fMRI).
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fMrI
We first contrasted responses to LOOM vs. 
STANDARD and RECEDE vs. STANDARD. These 
contrasts should reveal activations in regions 
related to the temporal evaluation of dynamic 
visual stimuli. For both contrasts, similar brain 
activations were detected (P < 0.001, corrected; 
Figure 3, Tables 1 and 2), namely a stronger 
activation was observed for the dynamic targets 
(LOOM, RECEDE) when compared with the 
STANDARD in (i) the left insula and the adja-
cent claustrum and basal ganglia, (ii) the ante-
rior cingulate cortex, (iii) the right middle and 
superior frontal cortex, and (iv) the left superior 
frontal regions. Additionally, activation was vis-
ible for RECEDE as compared to STANDARD in 
the right insula and the anterior cingulate cortex 
bilaterally. Next, we contrasted brain activations 
between LOOM and RECEDE, which should 
detect neural correlates for the time dilation effect 
proper. In Figure 2B, the large area between the 
curves for LOOM and RECEDE condition reflects 
the magnitude of the subjective looming effect, 
indicating a large perceptual difference with 
respect to duration between these two conditions. 
Accordingly, a contrast between fMRI signals for 
LOOM and RECEDE was obtained (P < 0.05, cor-
rected; Figure 4, Table 3). Significantly stronger 
activation for LOOM vs. RECEDE was found in 
the left medial frontal (including the left mid-
cingulate), the posterior cingulate and precuneus 
regions, together with small portions of the left 
superior frontal and middle frontal areas. By con-
trast, stronger activity for RECEDE versus LOOM 
was observed in the left anterior insula, the left 
dorsal thalamus and the anterior cerebellum.
dIscussIon
This is the first fMRI attempt at delineating brain 
regions involved in a visual temporal illusion, 
namely subjective time dilation with looming 
signals. The behavioral results replicated earlier 
findings (Tse et al., 2004; van Wassenhove et al., 
2008) and showed a profound temporal dilation 
effect. One goal was to use a predictable tempo-
ral locus for the targets (in each trial the target 
was consistently the fourth in the sequence of five 
events) in order to avoid any temporal expecta-
tion effect due to a sudden allocation of attention 
to the target: specifically, the overestimation of 
duration observed here depends on the nature 
of the stimulus as no effect was found with a 
receding signal (for a thorough discussion, see 
van Wassenhove et al., 2008).
In this context, one possible interpretation of 
the dilation illusion fits the cognitive pacemaker-
accumulator model of time perception: an emo-
tional response accompanied by increased arousal 
(looming) leads to an increased pacemaker rate 
and a larger accumulation of pacemaker “ticks” 
(Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; Wittmann and 
Paulus, 2008). However, the fMRI analysis shows 
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FIguRe 2 | Psychophysical results in the pre-fMRI session (left column) and in the fMRI session (right column): Percent longer responses [(A) pre-fMRI; (B) 
fMRI], points of subjective equality [PSe; (C) pre-fMRI; (D) fMRI].
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that similar brain regions were activated in LOOM 
and RECEDE conditions when contrasted with 
STANDARD. The outcome of these contrasts 
can be interpreted as indicating regions of inter-
est involved in the estimation of duration for 
dynamic or salient targets versus static standards. 
The insular cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, 
the basal ganglia as well as the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex were activated in both contrasts. 
This is consistent with prior neuroimaging find-
ings on time perception (Lewis and Miall, 2003; 
Rubia and Smith, 2004; Wittmann, 2009b,c). For 
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FIguRe 3 | Brain regions with significantly greater activation (yellow to red 
voxels) for LOOM vs. STANDARD (left) and ReCeDe vs. STANDARD (right) 
contrasts. Activation is depicted in axial (brain slices in row 1 and 2) and sagittal views 
(row 3 and 4); percent signal change is plotted (mean; SEM) as obtained through 
t-tests (P < 0.001, corrected). Numbers in slices correspond to numbers in bar charts 
representing the average percent signal change in specific regions of interest.
Table 1 | LOOM > STANDARD. Regions of significant activation (P < 0.001, corrected) for the contrast 
looming > standard disc.
Volume (μl) Talairach Brain area
 x  y  z
10368 −33  −28  52 L pre–post central gyrus, inferior parietal
5952 −30  −6  13 L insula, claustrum, lentiform nucleus, 
    putamen, thalamus
2240 35  45  20 R middle frontal, superior frontal
1472 1  29  34 L R dorsal ACC
1152 −26  41  28 L superior frontal
768 21  −48  61 R superior parietal
Regions that are also active in the contrast receding > standard disc are highlighted in bold.
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FIguRe 4 | Brain regions with significantly greater 
activation for LOOM versus ReCeDe (yellow to red voxels) 
and ReCeDe versus LOOM (blue voxels) contrasts. 
Activation is depicted in axial (upper row) and sagittal views 
(lower rows); percent signal change is plotted (mean; SEM) as 
obtained through t-tests (P < 0.05, corrected). Numbers in the 
slices correspond to numbers in bar charts representing 
average percent signal change in specific regions of interest.
Table 3 | LOOM > ReCeDe, ReCeDe > LOOM. Regions of significant activation (P < 0.05, corrected) for the 
contrast looming > receding disc and receding > looming disc.
Volume (μl) Talairach Brain area
 x  y  z
LOOMINg > ReCeDINg
15744 −15  −35  45 L medial frontal (cingulate), 
    posterior cingulate, precuneus
2176 −23  47  6 L superior frontal, middle frontal
1600 26  −46  32 White matter middle temporal 
gyrus
ReCeDINg > LOOMINg
2752 4  −47  −10 R cerebellum
2496 −34  16  8 L anterior insula
2496 9  −13  13 R thalamus
Table 2 | ReCeDe > STANDARD. Regions of significant activation (P < 0.001, corrected) for the contrast 
receding > standard disc.
Volume (μl) Talairach Brain area
 x  y  z
8832 −31  −5  12 L insula, claustrum, lentiform nucleus, 
    putamen, thalamus
7680 −34  −25  52 L pre–post central gyrus 
3840 1  27  34 L R dorsal ACC
2240 36  14  7 R insula
2112 37  43  19 R middle frontal, superior frontal
1536 22  −53  −15  R cerebellum
1088 −25  44  27 L superior frontal
  896 49  −14  17 R postcentral gyrus, posterior insula
Regions that are also active in the contrast looming > standard disc are highlighted in bold.
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(Northoff et al., 2011). As can be seen in Figure 3, 
a retrospenial region of the posterior cingulate 
cortex is also active during the presentation of the 
standards as compared to the dynamic targets, 
whereas more anterior and dorsal regions are also 
active in the looming versus receding contrast.
The left lateralized activation of the anterior 
insula found in RECEDE vs. LOOM is in line 
with an asymmetric representation of emotional 
feelings in the anterior insular cortex (Craig, 
2008). In primates, the insular cortex functions 
as the primary receptive area for homeosta-
sis. Re-representations of homeostatic afferent 
activity have been suggested to form the basis 
for the subjective awareness of emotional states 
(Craig, 2009b). The anterior insular and cingu-
late cortex are conjointly engaged during task 
performance as complementary limbic sensory 
and motor regions. Recent evidence suggests that 
the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate are 
part of the “core control network.” a system for 
task-dependent control of sensory information 
and goal-directed behavior (Cole and Schneider, 
2007; Craig, 2009b). This control network is also 
engaged in the perception of time: the anterior 
insula has been shown to be related to dysfunc-
tions in timing behavior (Rubia et al., 2009) and 
specifically involved in multisensory time syn-
chronization (Bushara et al., 2001). The home-
ostatic awareness model (Craig, 2008, 2009b) 
provides a neuroanatomical framework for fore-
brain emotional asymmetry in which the left 
forebrain is predominantly related to parasym-
pathetic activity (with approach, safety, positive 
affect), and the right forebrain is predominantly 
related to sympathetic activity (with arousal, 
danger, negative affect). Thus, activation in the 
left anterior insula for the RECEDE condition 
could be related to the feelings evoked with the 
receding (and thus non-threatening) stimulus, 
which is virtually moving away from the per-
ceiver. However, this interpretation is weakened 
by the fact that no right-sided anterior insula 
activation (related to negative affect) was found 
in the LOOM condition, which would have been 
predicted by this model.
Research in the field of time perception is 
far from reaching a consensus on the two main 
questions of how and where in the brain time 
is processed (Wittmann and van Wassenhove, 
2009). This is likely due to the complexity of time 
research as “time” encompasses a large number 
of aspects including duration on different time 
scales, synchrony, order etc. (van Wassenhove, 
2009). All together, this study is a first attempt 
at addressing the difficult issue of content and 
stimulus-specificity in temporal illusions. Our 
instance, the basal ganglia (sp. the striatum) has 
been ascribed a role as coincidence detector of 
oscillatory phases (Mattell and Meck, 2004; Buhusi 
and Meck, 2005); dorsolateral frontal regions have 
been associated with working memory related 
integration, and anterior  cingulate activity has 
been related to attention processes in time per-
ception (Lewis and Miall, 2006). This network may 
thus highlight the comparison process between the 
duration stored in memory (the standard dura-
tion or “reference duration;” Gallistel and Gibbon, 
2000) with the target duration to be compared 
irrespective of its content. It is noteworthy that 
activation of the insular cortex for both targets 
in the stream of standards is consistent with the 
insular cortex mediating alertness in the presence 
of salient stimulation (Sterzer and Kleinschmidt, 
2010). The regions found in this contrast is thus 
consistent with the implications of neural struc-
tures classically implicated in the clock model 
but such contrast does not offer an explanatory 
account with regards to the specificity of the illu-
sory percept found with looming versus receding 
signals.
One hypothesis considered in this study was 
that the experience of time is fundamentally 
self-referential (Craig, 2008, 2009a; Wittmann, 
2009b), i.e., uses the internal representation of 
self as a frame of reference (van de Grind, 2002; 
Northoff et al., 2011). In this context, the use of 
looming stimuli provides an explicit means to 
test the effect of a self-referential stimulus. In the 
decisive LOOM vs. RECEDE contrast, differential 
activation was found in the mid- and posterior 
cingulate regions of the left hemisphere. A grow-
ing number of empirical studies indicate that 
mid- and posterior midline cortical structures 
are associated with the “default brain network” 
which is active when an individual is in a resting 
state and presumably engaged in self-relevant 
thoughts and beliefs (Raichle et al., 2001; Wicker 
et al., 2003). A recent study addressing the issue 
of mentalizing about self vs. others (Lombardo 
et al., 2010) reported the activation of medial 
prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices as 
key structures. In another fMRI study, direct 
(one’s own self-beliefs) and reflected appraisals 
(one’s perception of how others view him or her) 
recruited the mid and posterior cingulate cortex 
(Ochsner et al., 2005). In the context of the task 
used here, the involvement of midline structures 
in the temporal perception of looming (but not 
receding) signals might be related to the “poten-
tial threat” carried by these signals to the per-
ceiver (Schiff et al., 1962). Future studies will have 
to delineate more carefully subregions within the 
cingulate cortex and their respective functions 
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